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Abstract: This study examined the relationship between ownership structure and performance of 
listed non-financial firms in Nigeria. Secondary data on managerial ownership, ownership 
concentration, foreign ownership, institutional ownership, Tobin q, return on assets, return on 
equities, and earnings per shares were collected from forty (40) sampled firms. The data were 
analyzed using canonical correlation and the findings showed that managerial and foreign 
ownerships are the dominant ownership structures while Tobin q, EPS, and ROA are the dominant 
performance measures. The study also found that ownership concentration, foreign ownership, and 
institutional ownership are positively correlated with firm performance, while managerial ownership 
is negatively correlated with firm performance. The study recommended that listed non-financial 
firms should encourage foreign investments in their firms and rewards performing managers with 
shares in the firm.    
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1. Introduction 
One of the primary corporate governance mechanisms is ownership structure and that is why the 
relationship between ownership structure and firm performance has been an important subject and 
ongoing debate in the corporate finance literature. The fundamental insight into this debate dates back 
to Berle and Means (1932), who argued that the separation of ownership and control of modern 
corporations naturally reduces management incentives to maximize corporate efficiency. Their 
concerns were later developed by Jensen and Meckling (1976) into what has subsequently become the 
“agency theory”, which has been characterized as “a theory of the corporate ownership structure” and 
the guiding framework for ownership-performance studies. Privy to this, in a related study by 
Demsetz and Lehn (1985), they stated that the ownership structure concept indicates that ownership 
is often endogenously determined for the maximization of the performance of the company as this 
benefits all owners. 
Since these early insights into this relationship, it has been extensively examined by analysts as 
well as scholars throughout the years. The modern organization emphasizes the divorce of 
management and ownership; in practice, the interests of group managing the company can differ from 
the interests of those that supply the capital to the firm. The concentration of ownership is considered 
as the tool for aligning the CEO self-intrinsic behavior to reduce the agency conflict and achieve the 
value maximization objective of the firms. 
Shareholders of publicly held corporations are so numerous and small that they are unable to 
effectively control the decisions of the management team, and thus cannot be assured that the 
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management team represents their interests. Many solutions to this problem have been advanced, like 
the disciplining effect of the takeover market, the positive incentive effects of the management 
shareholding stake, and the benefits of large monitoring shareholders. A different problem, however, 
arises in firms with large controlling shareholders. Since a large controlling shareholder has both the 
incentives and the power to control the management team's actions, management's misbehavior is a 
second-order problem when such a large shareholder exists. Instead, the main problem becomes 
controlling the large shareholder's abuse of minority shareholders. In other words, holders of a 
majority of the voting shares in a corporation, through their ability to elect and control a majority of 
the directors and to determine the outcome of shareholders' votes on other matters, have tremendous 
power to benefit themselves at the expense of minority shareholders. Thus, the type of owners as well 
as the distribution of ownership stakes will undoubtedly have an impact on the performance of firms. 
Most of the empirical literature studying the link between ownership structure and firm 
performance usually provide different and conflicting evidence on the effects. There are different 
reasons for these disagreements. It may be a result of researchers applying different estimation 
methods, performance and ownership measures, samples, and the corporate governance environment 
in which the firm operates. 
This paper is a moderate attempt to examine this relationship in Nigeria using a different 
estimation method, the canonical correlation. Ownership structure as the independent variable has 
multiple proxies that measure it, the same applies to firm performance as the dependent variable. This 
is the reason why most empirical researches in this area apply different variants of multiple regression, 
which can only use a single proxy as a dependent variable at a time. But for this research problem, 
however, the researcher is interested in relationships between sets of multiple dependent and multiple 
independent variables. Thus, the Canonical correlation analysis is the answer as it is a method that 
enables the assessment of the relationship between two sets of multiple variables. The data for the 
study is from five years financial statements of 40 non-financial firms between 2011 and 2015.the ratios 
used were four each for ownership structure and firm performance. The findings showed that 
ownership structure variables are positively correlated with firm performance. 
This study is divided into five sections. This first section is the introduction, which contains the 
motivation of the study and its objective. The second section is the literature review, which looked at 
the various studies in this area. The third section is data and methods, where the data used for the 
study were described. The fourth section is where we present the results and discuss the implications 
of the results. The final section concludes the study by summarizing the findings of the study. 
2. Literature Review 
There are several studies on ownership structure and firms' performance in both developing and 
developed countries (See Table 1 for a description of some of these studies). These studies, the 
differences in their locations, methodologies, and sectors made their findings differ. While some report 
significant effects of ownership structure on the performance of firms, others report insignificant 
effects of ownership structure on firms' performance. These divergent findings may also be a result of 
differences in the choice of variables used for ownership structure and also those of firms' 
performance. 
Rashid (2020) examined the mediating role of corporate board characteristics in the relationship 
between ownership structure and firm performance in the listed public limited companies of 
Bangladesh. The study found that foreign ownership and director ownership have a significant 
positive influence on both accounting and market-based firm's performance, while institutional 
ownership exhibits positive influence only on return on assets. The mediating effect results show that 
board size and board independence partially mediate the relationship between ownership structure 
and firm performance. Similarly, Al Farooque et al. (2020) investigated the effects of the corporate 
board, audit committee characteristics, and ownership structures on the market-based financial 
performance of listed firms in Thailand. Using GMM (generalized method of moments) and ordinary 
least squares on a sample of 452 firms, it was found that ownership concentration and family 
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ownership have no significant influence on market-based firm performance, while managerial 
ownership exerts a positive effect on performance. The study of Kao et al. (2018) used the data set of 
listed firms in Taiwan to empirically assess the effects of ownership structure and board of directors 
on firm value. The study employed panel estimation and 2SLS and found that block-holders' 
ownership, institutional ownership, foreign ownership, and family ownership are all positively related 
to firm value. 
Other studies are Alabdullah (2018); Mardnly et al. (2018); Ali et al. (2018). Alabdullah (2018) 
studied the link between ownership structure and firm performance in Jordan employing the multiple 
regression method to analyze data for non-financial firms listed in the Amman Stock Exchange. The 
study found managerial ownership has a positive impact on performance, showed no evidence to 
support the impact of foreign ownership on performance. Mardnly et al. (2018) examined the impact 
of aggregate and individual corporate governance provisions on firm performance on all firms listed 
at Damascus Securities Exchange (DSE). The study used multiple linear regression models and found 
that ownership structure is the only significant corporate governance provision in determining Syrian 
firms' performance, as it loads positively and significantly on firm performance proxies (ROA and 
EPS). The analysis of ownership structure items showed that foreign ownership has a positive and 
significant impact on performance. While Ali et al. (2018) analyzed the impact of ownership structure 
on firm performance and valuation across different geographical regions within mainland China using 
multivariate regression technique and found that institutional and state ownerships negatively affect 
market valuation throughout various geographical regions of China. Further, in East, Northwest, 
South Central, and Southwestern parts of China, managerial ownership and concentration of 
shareholding among the top 10 shareholders positively influence Return on Equity (ROE). 
Interestingly, institutional shareholding negatively affects Return on Assets (ROA), while institutional 
ownership has a neutral effect on the profitability margin in Northeast China. Although in the 
Northern part of China, this relationship is slightly positive. In the East China region, state ownership 
and ownership concentration are directly proportional to profitability margin. 
Al-Matari and Al-Arussi (2016) investigated the effect of ownership structure characteristics on 
firm performance in Oman. The study measured ownership structure using ownership concentration, 
managerial ownership, and government ownership and firm performance using the return on assets 
(ROA). Using multiple regression analysis on a sample of 81 firms for the period between 2012 and 
2014, the study found a positive and significant association between ownership concentration, 
government ownership, and firm performance. Tahir, Saleem, and Arshad (2015) explore the 
relationship between institutional ownership and firm performance in Pakistan between 2008and 2013. 
The study reported the issue of endogeneity problem and to deal with it, OLS and 2SLS were used. It 
was found that institutional ownership has a significant and positive relationship with firm 
performance. Firm performance was found to be negatively related to debt ratio and fixed 
expenditures. 
Srivastava (2011) investigated whether ownership type affects some key accounting and market 
performance indicators of listed firms in India and found the presence of highly concentrated 
ownership structure in the Indian market. The study used the regression and concludes that the 
dispersed ownership percentage influences certain dimensions of accounting performance indicators 
(ROA and ROE) but not stock market performance (P/E and P/BV). Similar to Srivastava (2010), Jadoon 
and Bajuri (2015) looked at the performance measure of firms in Pakistan from both accounting and 
market-based perspective but used Tobin Q. The study measured ownership concentration using the 
percentage of shareholding by the largest shareholder, five largest shareholders, and ten largest 
shareholders. Employing multiple regression, it was found that ownership concentration has a 
positive impact on firm performance for both accounting and market base performance parameters. 
However, Manawaduge and De Zoysa (2013) in Sri Lanka found that a greater concentration of 
ownership leads to better performance, using accounting measures, but found no significant impact 
using market-based performance measures.  Also similar to Jadoon and Bajuri (2015), on a study of 
listed companies in Iran, Alipour and Amjadi (2011) found that the effect is significant and negative 
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for ownership of biggest shareholder, positive and significant for ownership of five greater 
shareholders. It is also significant and negative for the institutional shareholders, managerial 
shareholding, and individual shareholders. In the studies of Srivastava (2011), and Jadoon and Bajuri 
(2015), both the dependent and independent variable has more than one variable which shows 
contradicting results. 
Measuring ownership structure using institutional and block ownership in a study of 
manufacturing companies in Sri Lanka, Abeyrathna, and Ishari (2016) found that while block 
ownership has a negative and insignificant relationship with firm performance, institutional 
ownership has a positive and insignificant relationship with firm performance. This finding is 
consistent with that of Demsetz and Villalonga (2001). The proxies used for ownership structure in 
Israel by Lauterbach and Vanisky's (1999) study were family firms, firms controlled by partnerships 
of individuals, concern-controlled firms, and firms where block holders have less than 50% of the vote. 
The study employed the technique of Data Envelopment Analysis and found that owner-manager 
firms are less efficient in generating net income than firms managed by a professional (non-owner) 
manager and that family firms run by their owners perform (relatively) the worst. This evidence 
suggests that the modern form of business organization, namely the open corporation with dispersed 
ownership and non-owner managers, promotes firm performance.  
Using pooled data, Manawaduge and De Zoysa (2013) measured performance with accounting 
and market-based indicators and provided evidence for a strong positive relationship between 
ownership concentration and accounting performance measures. However, the study found no 
significant impact on using market-based performance measures. Looking at variables of ownership 
from whether the firm is majorly owned or minority-owned by foreigners, Gurbuz and American 
(2010) employed panel analysis on a company listed on the Istanbul Stock Exchange and found that 
minority foreign-owned companies (MIN) perform better than domestic ones (DOM) in terms of 
operating profitability. When the return on assets is employed as a performance measure, it is observed 
that MIN performs better than both DOM and majority foreign-owned companies (MAJ). It is also 
found that MAJ performs worse than DOM. Their overall conclusion was that foreign ownership 
improves firm financial performance in Turkey up to a certain level, beyond which additional 
ownership by the foreigners does not add to firm profitability.  
Focusing on the conflict between majority and minority shareholders, and differentiating between 
the behavior of family and nonfamily firms using 586 non-listed Spanish firms, Arosa et al. (2009) 
found that a greater concentration of firm owners in the first generation of businesses may bring the 
monitoring and expropriation hypotheses into play, whereas firms in which subsequent generations 
have joined may show a greater spread of ownership. In first-generation family firms, the classic 
owner-manager conflict is mitigated due to the large shareholder's greater incentives to monitor the 
manager (Arosa et al, 2009). However, the second type of conflict appears. The large shareholder may 
use its controlling position in the firm to extract private benefits at the expense of the small 
shareholders. Scholten (2014) measured quadratic effects of ownership concentration (total and 
insider) on firm performance and found that firm performance first improves when total ownership 
concentration increases, and after a certain point (around 48% of total ownership concentration) firm 
performance decreases. For the effect of insider ownership concentration on firm performance the 
results were less convincing, but also statistically significant evidence was found. 
In Africa, Ongore (2011) investigated the effects of ownership structure on the performance of 
listed companies in Kenya using agency theory as a theoretical framework. The study operationalized 
ownership structure using ownership concentration (percentage of shares owned by the top five 
shareholders) and ownership identity (actual identity of shareholders), and measure performance with 
return on assets, return on equity, and dividend yield. Using Pearson's product-moment correlation 
and logistic regression, Ongore (2011) found that ownership concentration and government ownership 
have significant negative relationships with firm performance and that foreign ownership, diffuse 
ownership, corporation ownership, and managerial ownership were found to have significant positive 
relationships with firm performance.   
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In Nigeria, there are several studies on ownership structure and firm performance. But worthy of 
note due to their recent nature are those of Tsegba and Herbert (2013); Gugong et al. (2014); Andow 
and David (2016). The findings from these studies differ largely because of the different measures 
employed for both dependent and independent variables. Their methodologies also differ as well as 
the sectors studied. 
Table 1. Summary of Selected Studies on Ownership Structures. 
Author(s) Dependent 
variable(s) 
Independent 
variables 
Method of 
Analysis 
Findings 
Al-Matari & Al-
Arusi (2016) 
Return on Asset OWNCO, 
MGOWN, 
GOVOWN 
Multiple 
regression 
+ Significant 
Insignificant 
+ Significant 
Tahir et al. (2015) INOWN 
Return on Asset 
Return on Asset 
INOWN 
Debt ratio 
OLS 
2SLS 
negative 
+ Significant 
negative 
Srivastava (2011) Return on Asset 
Return on Equity 
P/E 
P/BV 
HIGHCON 
DISPOWN 
Regression  
 
Abeyrathna & Ishari 
(2016) 
Return on Equity 
 
INOWN 
BLOWN 
Regression +Insignificant 
- Insignificant 
Alipour & Amjadi 
(2011) 
Return on Asset 
 
BIGSH 
5%BIGSH 
INOWN 
INDSH 
Panel regression - Significant 
+significant 
- Significant 
- Significant 
 
Tsegba & Herbert 
(2013) 
Market Price 
EPS 
OWNCO 
FOWN 
Panel regression -Significant 
+Significant 
Manawaduge & De 
Zoysa (2013) 
Accounting & 
Market 
Performance 
CONOWN OLS +Significant 
+Insignificant 
Gurbuz & American 
(2010) 
Return on Asset 
 
Min FOWN 
Maj FOWN 
Panel regression Significant 
Gugong et al. (2014) Return on Asset 
Return on Equity 
 
MGOWN 
INOWN 
Panel regression  +Significant 
Andow & David 
(2016) 
financial 
performance 
FOWN OLS -Significant 
Ongore (2011) Return on Asset 
Return on 
EquityDividend 
Yield 
OWNCO 
GOVOWN 
OWNID 
Correlation 
Logit regression 
-Significant 
-Significant 
+Significant 
Note. Dependent and independent variables used in different studies on ownership structures and their 
findings. INOWN =Institutional ownership; P/E = Price earnings ratio; P/BV = Price to book value; EPS 
= Earnings per share; OWNCO =Ownership concentration; MGOWN = Managerial ownership; 
GOVOWN = Government ownership; HIGHCON= High concentration; DISPOWN = Dispersed 
ownership; BLOWN = Block ownership; BIGSH = Big shareholders; INDSH = Individual shareholders; 
FOWN = Foreign ownership; Min = Minority; Maj = Majority; OWNID = Ownership identity; OLS = 
Ordinary least square; 2SLS = Two stage least square. 
Tsegba and Herbert (2013) used OLS to study 72 non-financial firms listed on the Nigerian Stock 
Exchange and found that while concentrated ownership has a significant negative impact on firm 
performance, foreign ownership has a significant positive impact on firm performance. Gugong et al. 
(2014) focused on both two aspects of ownership structure; managerial and institutional shareholding, 
and Firm's performance; Return on assets (ROA) and Return on Equity (ROE) for 17 listed insurance 
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companies in Nigeria. Using panel regression, their findings indicated that there is a positive 
significant relationship between ownership structure and firm performance as measured by ROA and 
ROE. Andow and David (2016) assessed the impact of ownership structure on financial performance, 
using listed conglomerate firms in Nigeria. The study used regression to show that managerial and 
foreign ownership harms the performance of listed conglomerate firms. 
Finally, looking at the researches reviewed in this study, one realizes that there are several 
measures for ownership structures as there are for firm performance. Most of the studies employed 
one form of regressions or the other in trying to model their study. Because of these, some had to write 
as many models as per their dependent variables which provides contradictory results. The study of 
these natures with multiple dependents and independents variables can best be modeled using 
multivariate techniques and that is what this study addresses. 
3. Data and Methods  
3.1 Data and Variables 
Data for the study were collected from forty (40) non-financial firms listed on the NSE between 
2011 and 2015 because the up-to-date information on most of these firms ends in 2015. Forty (40) of 
these firms were selected out of the sixty-seven (67) non-financial firms listed on the NSE, using the 
criteria that their; 
1.  Stocks must be traded actively during the study periods 
2.  Annual reports must be complete and up to date. 
The study is restricted to non-financial firms because studies in this area in Nigeria are mostly on 
banks and other financial institutions. 
Table 2. Description and Measurement of Variables 
Variables Description Measurement 
MGOWN Percentage of share owned by managers of the firms Ratio scale 
OWNCO the ratio of the stockholdings of the largest and the second 
largest owner 
Ratio scale 
FIOWC percentage of shares held by each type of foreigners Ratio scale 
INOWC Percentage of stocks held by investment firms, funds, and 
other large entities 
Ratio scale 
RETOA The ratio of net income to total assets Ratio scale 
RETOE The ratio of net income to shareholders equity Ratio scale 
TOBINQ the market value of firms divided by its assets Ratio scale 
EPS company's net income divided by the total number of 
outstanding shares. 
Ratio scale 
Note. The variables are computed as ratios. MGOWN = Managerial Ownership; OWNCO = Ownership 
Concentration; FIOWC; Foreign Institutional Ownership Concentration; INOWC = Institutional 
Ownership Concentration; RETOE = Return on Equity; EPS = Earnings Per Share; RETOA = Return on 
Assets 
The data were collected from the annual reports of these firms, which were accessible on the 
websites of NSE and the firms. The study employed eight variables; four as a measure for ownership 
structure and the other four as measures for firms' performance.  The variables for ownership 
structure are managerial ownership (MGOWN), ownership concentration (OWNCO), foreign 
ownership concentration (FIOWC), and institutional ownership (INOWC) while the variables for 
firms' performance are Return on asset (RETOA), return on equity (RETOE), Tobin Q, and Earning Per 
Share (EPS). The descriptions and measurements for these variables are shown in Table 2. 
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3.2 Methods 
The method of data analysis for this study was canonical correlation because the data are 
multivariate, with four dependent variables. The Canonical Correlation is a multivariate analysis of 
correlation. It is the analysis of multiple-X multiple-Y correlation, which measures the strength of 
association between two Canonical Variates. For multiple X and Y the canonical correlation analysis 
constructs two variates: 
𝐶𝑉𝑥1 = 𝑎1𝑥1 + 𝑎2𝑥2 + 𝑎3𝑥3 + … + 𝑎𝑛𝑥𝑛         (1) 
𝐶𝑉𝑦1 = 𝑏1𝑦1 + 𝑏2𝑦2 + 𝑏3𝑦3 + … + 𝑏𝑚𝑥𝑚       (2) 
The canonical weights a1…an and b1…bn are chosen so that they maximize the correlation between 
the canonical variates CVX1 and CVY1.  
The two-column vectors X and Y are given as; 
X = (MGOWN, OWNCO, FIOWC, INOWC)  
Y = (TOBIN Q, RETOA, RETOE, EPS)  
The cross variance ∑𝑋𝑌 = Cov (X, Y) is an n × m matrix whose (i, j) entry is the covariance cov(xi, 
yi). The model seeks vectors a(aЄRn) and b(bЄRm) such that the random variable aT X and bT Y maximize 
the correlation p = corr (aT X, bT Y). The random variables U = aT X and V = bT Y are the first pair of 
canonical variables. Then one seeks vectors maximizing the same correlation subject to the constraint 
that they are to be uncorrelated with the first pair of canonical variables; this gives the second pair of 
canonical variables. This procedure may be continued up to min {m, n} times. 
Specifically, the Canonical correlation model for this study is expressed in equation (3) and (4) as 
the relationship is depicted in Figure 1. 
𝐶𝑉𝑥1  = 𝛼1 MGOWN + α2OWNCO + α3FIOWC + α4INOWC   (3)  
𝐶𝑉𝑦1 = β1TOBINQ + β2RETOA + β3RETOE+ β4EPS    (4) 
Figure 1. Canonical Correlation Model 
 
Note. The ownership structure has four proxies. Firms' performance has four proxies. MGOWN = 
Managerial Ownership; OWNCO = Ownership Concentration; FIOWC; Foreign Institutional 
Ownership Concentration; INOWC = Institutional Ownership Concentration; RETOE = Return on 
Equity; EPS = Earnings Per Share; RETOA = Return on Assets 
4. Results and Discussion 
Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics for all the variables used in this study. The average value 
for TOBIN Q, RETOE, EPS, and RETOA are 1.953, 19.667, 2.180, and 6.370 respectively. The minimum 
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and maximum value of the performance variables shows the presence of outliers as there is a larger 
difference between these values for all variables. This is because some of the firms in the panel data 
set reported some abnormally high or low-performance indicators. 
For the ownership structure measures, the average values are 13.503, 57.240, 
24.541,51.312,1.953,19.667,2.180, and 6.370 for MGOWN, OWNCO, FIOWC, INOWC, TOBINQ, 
RETOE, EPS, and RETOA respectively. The minimum and maximum value of these variables also 
show the presence of outliers as there some of the ownership structure for some of the firms were 
zeros. This result in a larger difference between these values for all variables 
Table 3. Summary Statistics of the variable 
STATS TOBINQ RETOE EPS RETOA MGOWN OWNCO FIOWC INOWC 
Mean 1.953 19.667 2.180 6.370 13.503 57.240 24.541 51.312 
p50 1.355 13.18 0.755 5.66 0.965 60 0 57 
Sd 1.668 54.829 4.865 10.981 22.418 19.269 29.559 25.561 
Min 0.39 -112.45 -2.51 -25.69 0 0 0 0 
Max 10.83 520.52 32.53 53.96 84.44 91 82 91 
N 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 
Note. The values are in percentages. STATS = Statistic; RETOE = Return on Equity; EPS = Earnings Per 
Share; RETOA = Return on Assets; MGOWN = Managerial Ownership; OWNCO = Ownership 
Concentration; FIOWC; Foreign Ownership Concentration; INOWC = Institutional Ownership 
Concentration; p50 = Median; Sd = Standard deviation; Min = Minimum value; Max = Maximum value 
Table 4 shows the correlation analysis exhibited by the performance variables. It shows positive 
relationships among all of them. None of the correlation value shows a strong value, meaning that 
there is no Multicollinearity among the variables.    
Table 4. Correlation Matrix of the Performance Variables 
 
TOBINQ RETOE EPS RETOA 
TOBINQ 1.0000 
   
RETOE 0.2790 1.0000 
  
EPS 0.5495 0.1539 1.0000 
 
RETOA 0.6178 0.2669 0.4262 1.0000 
Note. The correlation coefficient of dependent variables to check multicollinearity. RETOE = Return on 
Equity; EPS = Earnings Per Share; RETOA = Return on Assets 
Table 5 shows the correlation analysis exhibited by the ownership structure variables. Some 
exhibited negative relationships and others show positive relationships between them. The correlation 
values are not strong except that of OWNCO and INOWC.   
Table 5. Correlation Matrix of the Ownership Structures Variables 
 
MGOWN OWNCO FIOWC INOWC 
MGOWN 1.0000 
   
OWNCO -0.1418 1.0000 
  
FIOWC -0.4660 0.2715 1.0000 
 
INOWC -0.3321 0.8636 0.3902 1.0000 
Note. The correlation coefficient of independent variables to check multicollinearity. MGOWN = 
Managerial Ownership; OWNCO = Ownership Concentration; FIOWC; Foreign Institutional 
Ownership Concentration; INOWC = Institutional Ownership Concentration 
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A canonical correlation analysis was conducted using the four variables of ownership structure 
as predictors of the 4 firms’ performance variables to evaluate the multivariate shared relationship 
between the two variable sets (ownership structure and firms’ performance). The analysis yielded four 
functions with canonical correlation coefficients (Rc) of 0.4392, 0.2658, 0.0884, and 0.0259. The squared 
canonical correlations (Rc2) of 0.1929, 0.0706, 0.0078, and 0.00067 for each successive function. This 
shows that the ownership structure has a positive correlation with the performance measures. This 
finding is consistent with the studies of Alfarooque et al. (2020); Al-Matari and Al-Arusi (2016), 
Gugong et al. (2014); Kao et al. (2018); Manawaduge and De Zoysa (2013); Mardnlt et al. (2018); Rashid 
(2020) with similar findings. Other studies like Ali (2018); Alipor and Amjadi (2011), Andow and David 
(2016), Ongore (2011), and Tahir et al. (2015) reported a negative correlation, which made their results 
inconsistent with that of this study. 
Table 6. Correlation Coefficients  
0.4392 0.2658 0.0884 0.0259 
Note. The canonical correlation coefficient of the four functions. Functions 1 and 2 give higher values. 
Collectively, the full model across all functions was statistically significant using the Wilks’s λ = 
0.7438 criterion, F (16, 587.21) = 3.7344, p = 0.000. Because Wilks’s λ represents the variance unexplained 
by the model, 1 – λ yields the full model effect size in an r2 metric. Thus, for the set of four canonical 
functions, the r2 type effect size was .2562, which indicates that the full model explained a substantial 
portion, about 26%, of the variance shared between the variable sets. 
Table 7. Test of Significance of all Canonical Correlations 
Tests Statistic df1 df2 F Prob>F 
 
Wilks' lambda 0.7438 16 587.207 3.7344 0.000 A 
Pillai's trace 0.2720 16 780 3.5567 0.000 A 
Lawley-Hotelling trace 0.3235 16 762 3.8518 0.000 A 
Roy's largest root 0.2390 4 195 11.6498 0.000 U 
Note. The models are significant at p = 5%, as indicated by the four different tests 
The dimension reduction analysis allows us to test the hierarchal arrangement of functions for 
statistical significance. As noted, the full model (Functions 1 to 4) was statistically significant. 
Functions 2 to 4 was also statistically significant at 10%, 3 to 4 and 4 did not explain a statistically 
significant amount of shared variance between the variable sets, F(4, 388) = 0.4138, p = 0.4138, and F(1, 
195) = 0.1313, p = 0.7175, respectively.  
Given the effects for each function, only the first two functions were considered noteworthy in 
the context of this study (19% and 7% of the shared variance, respectively), and thus, was interpreted 
The last two functions only explained 0.78% and 0.067%, respectively, of the remaining variance in the 
variable sets after the extraction of the prior functions. 
Table 8 presents the standardized canonical function coefficients and loadings coefficients for 
Functions 1 and 2. The squared loadings coefficients are also given as well as the commonalities (h2) 
across the two functions for each variable. Looking at the Function 1 coefficients, one sees that relevant 
criterion variables were primarily foreign ownership concentration and managerial ownership. This 
conclusion was supported by the squared structure (loading) coefficients. These ownership structures 
also tended to have larger canonical function coefficients. This is in line with the study of Alfarooque 
(2020); Gurbuz and American (2010), Kao et al. (2020); Mardnly et al (2018); Rashid (2020); Tsegba and 
Herbert (2013), but Ali et al. (2020); Al-Matari and Al-Arusi (2016) reported differently. 
Furthermore, except for managerial ownership, all of these variables' structure coefficients had 
the same sign, indicating that they were all positively related. Managerial ownership was inversely 
related to the other performance measures, which is inconsistent with the findings of Ali et al. (2020); 
Al-Matari and Al-Arusi (2016). 
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Table 8. Canonical Solution for Ownership Structure Predicting Firms’ Performance 
 
function 1 
 
function 2 
 
Variable std. coeff loadings (rs) rs2(%) 
 
std. coeff loadings (rs) rs2(%) h2(%) 
MGOWN -0.2896 -0.6900 47.61 
 
-0.7171 -0.5900 34.81 82.42 
OWNCO -0.4739 0.0312 0.10 
 
-0.5472 0.2165 4.69 4.78 
FIOWC 0.7996 0.9174 84.16 
 
-0.8407 -0.2529 6.40 90.56 
INOWC 0.2858 0.2848 8.11 
 
1.0308 0.4683 21.93 30.04 
TOBINQ 0.8295 0.6235 38.88 
 
0.5944 0.7801 60.86 99.73 
RETOE 0.0751 0.1606 2.58 
 
0.0094 0.2921 8.53 11.11 
EPS 0.5736 0.6670 44.49 
 
-0.4527 0.1732 3.00 47.49 
RETOA -0.8774 -0.1005 1.01 
 
0.6988 0.8757 76.69 77.70 
Note. The standard coefficient shows the direction of relationships. The loadings and the squared 
loadings show which criterion variable(s) is relevant. The communalities (h2) is the sum of squared 
factor loadings for the variables. MGOWN = Managerial Ownership; OWNCO = Ownership 
Concentration; FIOWC; Foreign Ownership Concentration; INOWC = Institutional Ownership 
Concentration; RETOE = Return on Equity; EPS = Earnings Per Share; RETOA = Return on Assets. 
Regarding the predictor variable set in Function 1, earning per share and Tobin q variables were 
the primary contributors to the predictor synthetic variable. Because the structure coefficient for all the 
primary contributors was positive, they are positively related to all of the ownership structure 
variables. 
Moving to Function 2, the coefficients in Table 8 suggest that the only criterion variables of 
relevance were managerial ownership and institutional ownership concentration. While managerial 
ownership is positively related as found by Alabdullah (2018); Al-Matari and Al-Arusi (2016); Rashid 
(2020), institutional ownership concentration was inversely related on this function (Ali et al., 2018), 
which is not consistent with the study of Abeyrathna & Ishari (2016). As for performance measures, 
Tobin q and return on assets were the dominant predictors, and these performance variables were also 
inversely related. 
5. Conclusions 
This study examined the relationship between ownership structure and performance of listed 
non-financial firms in Nigeria using the canonical correlation to estimate the overall relationship. From 
the findings, it can be concluded that the dominant ownership structure variables in the relationship 
are managerial and foreign ownership, while the dominants performance variables are the Tobin q, 
earning per share, and return on asset. The ownership structure variables are all positively correlated 
with a firm performance for listed non-financial firms in Nigeria. It is recommended that non-financial 
firms should encourage managerial ownership in the form of rewarding managers with shares in the 
firm. They should also encourage foreign ownership in the firm as this will boost investors’ confidence. 
The limitations of this study are the restrictions of the dependent and independent variables to 
only four each and the inability to access the data of all the listed non-financial firms on the NSE. 
Although, the data of the firms collected are the dominant and consistent players in the industry. They 
trade on the floor of the NSE frequently and publish their annual reports consistently. This makes the 
result of the study credible and generalizable. Thus, subsequent studies can extend the study using 
other ownership structure and performance variables not considered in this study. 
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